Reputation Schemes for Pervasive Social Networks with Anonymity by Garms, Lydia et al.
Reputation Schemes for Pervasive Social Networks with Anonymity
Lydia Garms∗ Keith Martin† Siaw–Lynn Ng‡
Information Security Group, Royal Holloway, University of London
Email: ∗Lydia.Garms.2015@rhul.ac.uk, †Keith.Martin@rhul.ac.uk, ‡S.Ng.rhul.ac.uk
September 26, 2017
Abstract
Pervasive Social Networks of Strangers are available constantly, connecting users directly with no
preexisting relationships. Such networks demand a high level of privacy, as users should be anonymous
and their behaviour unlinkable. However, the anonymity of users could lead to abusive messages, spam,
or fraud. A possible solution is to keep track of users’ reputations, based on feedback from other users.
However, the need to collate feedback on user behaviour to form reputations is at odds with the need
for privacy. Anonymous and unlinkable feedback is also required, whilst multiple feedbacks given on the
same item should be detected. To resolve this, we use group signatures and direct anonymous attestation,
to give a reputation-based messaging scheme.
1 Introduction
1.1 Pervasive Social Networks
A Pervasive Social Network (PSN) [14] is a social network that is available constantly. The term originates
from pervasive technology, such as smart phones and wearables.
Communication in PSNs takes place on the go. Therefore, users should be able to communicate directly,
without the involvement of a server to verify that messages satisfy the requirements for the social network,
such as checking that the sender is enrolled in the scheme, or that messages follow a prescribed format. Users
who do not conform may be revoked from the network.
1.2 Pervasive Social Networks of Strangers
Pervasive Social Networks of Strangers are PSNs where users communicate with those they have no previous
relationship with. Examples of this include the “meeting new friends” feature of the app Kik [2], which had
300 million registered users in May 2016 [3], and Firechat [1], on which users broadcast messages publicly.
In PSNs of Strangers, users are talking to people they do not trust. Therefore, broadcast public messages
should be untraceable, which means we cannot discover a user’s long term identity. For example, FireChat
was used during the 2014 protests in Hong Kong for anonymous communication [1]. Also, users may not
want their behaviour on the social network to be linked together, as one slip could de-anonymise their entire
behaviour.
1.3 Reputation Schemes for PSNs of Strangers
With no preexisting trust relationships between users, and no ability to build user profiles, it is not clear
how users could judge the accuracy of public messages they receive. Therefore, reputation schemes, which
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keep track of a reputation value for each user, could help by replacing preexisting trust. This represents how
well a user has behaved in the past, which gives an indication of how that user may be behaving currently.
Users that behave maliciously can be punished by revoking them.
To form reputation values, users give feedback on other users’ public messages. In order to collate this
feedback, the subject of the feedback must be linked to an identity. Multiple feedback on the same subject
should also be detected as this unfairly skews users’ reputations.
The incorporation of a reputation scheme must leave privacy intact. Unfortunately the two are at odds
with each other. Users’ behaviour must be linked to form a reputation, but users’ behaviour should be
unlinkable to protect their privacy. This is the problem we aim to solve.
1.4 Existing Work
Existing reputation schemes for social networks can be categorized into distributed and centralised schemes.
Distributed reputation schemes, such as [9], have no central server. These schemes use local reputation,
evaluated by a user on other users, based on first hand experience or second hand accounts [12]. However, to
form local reputations, a user’s behaviour must be linkable to other users. Therefore, distributed reputation
schemes cannot have unlinkability as a privacy guarantee.
In a centralised scheme, privacy can be achieved simply. The server can authenticate the user, discover
the correct reputation, and then distribute the message with a fresh anonymous pseudonym. An example of
a centralised reputation scheme is AnonRep [15] for internet message boards. However, in our setting, users
must be able to communicate directly.
A hybrid is necessary, with a central server to collate feedback for privacy, while users communicate
directly.
An example of a hybrid scheme is PerChatRep [14]. Local reputations are used, as well as a global
reputation calculated by a Trusted Server (TS). Because privacy is achieved by changing the pseudonyms
of users regularly, it does not achieve total unlinkability. If pseudonyms change for each new message, then
the receiver must receive new pseudonyms from the TS each time. We would like all users’ behaviour to be
unlinkable, without constant communication with the server.
Another example of a hybrid reputation scheme is devised in [13] for Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs).
In this scheme messages and feedback are anonymous and unlinkable to other users. Constant communica-
tion with a server is not required. However, for PSNs of Strangers it is important that feedback is anonymous
and unlinkable even to the TS, to encourage honest feedback.
Therefore, we propose a reputation–based messaging scheme that fully satisfies our requirements.
1.5 Our Contribution
We use group signature schemes and direct anonymous attestation to create a scheme that enables users
to broadcast public messages anonymously alongside reputation, without a server. Public messages are
unlinkable and untraceable to users. Feedback is anonymous and unlinkable to all, unless multiple feedback
is given on the same subject, which can be detected.
Section 2 will specify the functionality and privacy required. Section 3 describes the signature schemes
that will be used in Section 4 to construct the reputation-based messaging scheme. Section 5 evaluates
whether the requirements from Section 2 are satisfied.
2 Requirements for our Reputation-based Messaging Scheme
Our scheme consists of a set of users, and a Trusted Server (TS). Each user should be able to broadcast
public messages. Feedback can be given to the TS on these public messages. The requirements are as follows.
1. Verifiability
(a) Only users who are enrolled in the scheme should be able to send public messages, or feedback.
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(b) Users should be able to verify the reputation of the author of public messages.
(c) The TS should be able to verify the reputation of the author of feedback.
2. Correctness
(a) The TS should be able to link public messages by author, so that feedback can be attributed
correctly to build reputations.
(b) The TS should be able to determine whether multiple feedback has been given on the same subject,
so that reputations formed are fair.
(c) It should be possible to revoke users who behave badly from the scheme. A revoked user is unable
to broadcast public messages or give feedback.
3. Privacy
(a) Public messages are untraceable and unlinkable by other users.
(b) If feedback is given once per public message, feedback is untraceable and unlinkable to all.
3 Signature Schemes
3.1 Fulfilling the Requirements
We first consider broadcasting public messages. For a user to prove they have enrolled, as in requirement
1(a), they must send a signature. These signatures must be untraceable and unlinkable due to 3(a). For
2(a), the TS must be able to link messages with the same author. To allow this we could give the TS a
secret key. Group Signature Schemes [8] satisfy this.
When sending feedback, for 1(a), a user must prove they have enrolled. There should be no opener,
because feedback should be untraceable and unlinkable to all for 3(b). However, for 2(b) it must be possible
to only link users who give multiple feedback on the same item. Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) [6]
satisfies this as it allows messages with the same author and “basename” to be linked. When the basename
is the subject of the feedback, we can link multiple feedback on a message.
We can satisfy 1(b) and 1(c), by binding reputation to both types of signatures. We use BBS* [13], to
do this for sending public messages. We introduce a modified DAA scheme CDL*, to do this for providing
feedback.
In BBS* and CDL* users must regularly update their secret keys. We can revoke users, for 2(c), by no
longer updating them. This allows us to avoid revocation lists.
3.2 Group Signatures
Group signatures [8] prove the signer is a member of a group, without revealing their identity. A secret key
can open the signature to reveal the signer.
3.3 BBS*
BBS* [13] is a modification of BBS [5] to allow the visible binding of a reputation value to the signature,
and to allow updates of a user’s secret key following reputation change without a secure channel.
Unfortunately, in [13] the user can manipulate their secret key to increase their reputation by an arbitrary
factor, by raising the RCTi from the original scheme to the power of this factor. We solve this by hashing
Ki
r in BUpdate* as shown below. We give a brief description of each algorithm, details can be found in [13].
• BKeyGen*: on input the total number of time intervals l, the TS outputs the public parameters
gppm = (G1,G2,G3, p, ψ, tˆ1, H1, H2), K = {Ki : i ∈ [l]}, the public key gpkm for sending messages and
the TS’s secret key smk.
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• BJoin*: on input the secret message key smk, the TS enrols a user b and generates their group member
secret key gskmb = (Zb, xb).
• BUpdate*: this protocol, between a user b and the TS, updates user b’s secret key gskmb = (Zb, xb) so
it is bound to their new reputation rb,i at time interval Ti. The smk = (γ, η1, η2), Ki ∈ K, rb,i and




γ+xb , which is sent publicly to the user b, alongside rb,i,
and used to output gskmb,i = (Zb,i, xb). The hash function H1 is introduced to stop the above attack.
• BSign*: the user b, with reputation rb,i, signs message M during time interval Ti using the updated
public key gpkmi,rb,i and their secret key gsk
m
b,i to output a signature σ, which is bound to rb,i.
• BVerify*: verifies a signature σ including reputation r on M . Ki ∈ K and r is used to compute the
updated public key gpkmi,r from gpk
m, which is used to verify the signature.
• BOpen*: the TS uses the secret message key smk and public key gpkm to discover Zb,i, the identity
of the author b of the signature σ on message M .
3.4 Direct Anonymous Attestation
Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) [6] is a signature scheme that allows a user to authenticate themselves
as an authorised signer, without revealing their identity. Unlike group signatures, there is no opening
function. Instead there is user-controlled linkability – a user can control whether two messages can be
linked.
3.5 CDL*
The DAA scheme we will modify [7], is referred to as the CDL scheme. This modification, in CDL*, binds
the reputation value to the signatures visibly, using an updated secret key received during CDLUpdate*.
This forces users to reveal their reputation when signing.
This modification includes the addition of CDLUpdate*, and small changes in CDLKeyGen*, CDLSign*,
CDLVerify* given in Figure 2. The CDL* signature scheme consists of the following algorithms/ protocols.
• CDLKeyGen*: on input the total number of time intervals l, and the set of reputation values R, the
TS outputs the public parameters gppfb, the public set E and private set Ξ, the public key for feedback
gpkfb , and the secret feedback key sfbk .
• CDLJoin*: on input the secret feedback key sfbk the TS enrols a user b. The TS outputs the user’s
credential creb for use in CDLUpdate* and the user b outputs their creb and their group member secret
key for feedback fb which is not known by the TS.
• CDLUpdate*: this protocol, between a user b and the TS, updates user b’s credential creb so it is
bound to their new reputation rb,i at time interval Ti. The parameters ξi,rb,i , which are known only




i , which are
sent publicly to the user b, alongside rb,i, and used to update the credential to output creb,i.
• CDLSign*: user b, with reputation rb,i, signs a feedback report fbr = (msg, fbk) during time interval Ti
using the updated public key gpkfbi,rb,i , their secret key for feedback gsk
fb
b , and their updated credential
creb,i to output a signature σ, which is bound to rb,i.
• CDLVerify*: verifies a signature σ, from time interval Ti, including reputation r, on M . Ei,r ∈ E and
r is used to compute gpkfbi,r from gpk
fb , which is used to verify the signature.





= (G4,G5,G6, p, tˆ2, P4, P5, H3, H4), gpkfb , sfbk)← CDLKeyGen(l)
∀i ∈ [l], r ∈ R ξi,r ←$Z∗p, Ei,r ← P5ξi,r
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i,r ← (X,Y Ei,r)





CDLSign*(msg, fbk , i, rb,i, gsk
fb




return (CDLSign*(msg, fbk , gsk
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i , P5) 6= tˆ2(Ab, Ei,rb,i ) then abort
if tˆ2(RCT
′
i , X) 6= tˆ2(RCT ′′i , P5) then abort
Bb,i ← BbRCT ′i ;Cb,i ← CbRCT ′′i fb ;Db,i ← Bb,ifb
return creb,i ← (Ab, Bb,i, Cb,i, Db,i), rb,i
Figure 1: CDLKeyGen*, CDLSign*, CDLVerify* and CDLUpdate*.
We argue that the security guarantees of CDL [7] carry forward to the modified scheme. There are four
modifications to the scheme:
• The inclusion of Ξ = {ξi,r : i ∈ [l], r ∈ R} and E = {Ei,r = P5ξi,r : i ∈ [l], r ∈ R}, as part of the private
and public parameters.
• Publicly sending RCT ′i and RCT ′′i .
• Updating the credential used to sign the signature.
• Updating the public key used to verify the signature.
Based on the original hardness assumptions, for all i ∈ [l], r ∈ R, Ei,r does not reveal ξi,r. Also RCT ′i
and RCT ′′i do not reveal ξi,r, or α. None of these steps reveal the secret keys of users fb, the group manager’s
secret feedback key sfbk, or the set of secret parameters Ξ. Therefore, messages cannot be forged.
Each signature is an instance of the original scheme, with the new public key and credential. Therefore,
the untraceability and unlinkability of signatures holds.
4 Our Reputation-Based Messaging scheme
We describe a reputation-based messaging scheme, based on [13]. The following are used in the scheme:
• Algorithms Aggr and Detect, that respectively collate feedback to evaluate a reputation for a user and
detect users to be revoked.
• TimeDiscount: R>0 → [0, 1] , a non-increasing function with TimeDiscount(0) = 1.
• A threshold Ψ, that determines the reputation level below which the TS will stop providing secret
keys.
• The BBS* and CDL* schemes from III(C)/ III(E).
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4.1 Scheme Initialisation
This takes place when the reputation scheme is set up.
1. The TS initialises TimeDiscount, Aggr, Detect and Ψ, BBS* and CDL*. The TS creates a database, to
store users’ reputation and feedback. Feedback for a message msg will be stored in the list fblmsg.
2. The TS chooses l time intervals {Ti : 0 ≤ i ≤ l}. It picks a set of reputation values, R = {0, 1, ..., rmax}
with rmax < p.
3. BKeyGen*(l) outputs gppm, gpkm, K, and smk.
4. CDLKeyGen*(l,R) outputs gppfb, gpkfb , E , Ξ, and sfbk .
4.2 User Registration
This takes place when a user joins the social network.
1. The TS provides the user b with CDL* and BBS*, gpkm, gpkfb , as well as the public parameters, gppm,
gppfb, K and E .
2. BJoin*(smk, b, gppm) is executed by the TS. User b is given their group member secret key for sending
messages, gskmb = (Zb, xb), over a secure channel.
3. CDLJoin* is executed between the TS with input (b, gpkfb , sfbk , gppfb) and a user b with input
(gpkfb , gppfb). The user b outputs their group member secret key for feedback, gskfbb = fb, and
credential creb. The TS will output creb.
4. The TS creates a record in its database for the user b. An entry will be (b, Zb, rb,i, Fb, creb), as well as
values of Zb,i for upcoming time intervals.
4.3 Reputation Retrieval
During Ti, a user b retrieves their reputation.
1. To authenticate itself to the TS, b sends a reputation score request signed with BSign*, using gskmb,i.
The TS then uses BOpen*, to discover the signers identity, and finds their current reputation score
rb,i.
2. If b has been revoked, reputation retrieval will stop. Otherwise the TS computes time discounted






i+d+1 < Ψ, where r
′
i+k = rb,i · TimeDiscount(ti+k − ti).
3. For all j = i, ..., (i+ d), BUpdate* is implemented with input (b, j, r′j , smk, gsk
m
b , gpp
m,K), to the TS
and input (j, gskmb , gpk
m, gppm,K), to the user b. The user receives their updated signing key and
reputation for time interval Tj , gskmb,j = (Zb,j , xb) and rb,j . The TS stores these Zb,j for further use.
4. For all j = i, ..., (i + d), CDLUpdate* is implemented with input (b, j, r′j , sfbk , creb, gpp
fb,Ξ), to the
TS and input (j, fb, creb, gpk
fb , gppfb, E) to the user b. The user receives their updated credential, and
reputation for time interval Tj .
4.4 Public Message Broadcast
A user b with reputation rb,i at time interval Ti broadcasts a public message M to other users.
1. The user computes gpkmi,rb,i = (H1(K
rb,i
i )P1, P2, U, V, I,W ), given gpk
m = (P1, P2, U, V, I,W ),
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, gppm) is run by user b, to output signature σ on M . The user then
broadcasts the message tuple, msg = (M,σ).
3. When msg = (M,σ) is received, the user determines the current time interval Tj , and checks that
j = i, and r < rmax. The user runs BVerify*(M,σ, gpkm, gppm,K), and accepts if true.
4.5 Feedback Reporting
A user b1 gives feedback fbk on a message msg = (M,σ) sent by b2. Let fbr = (msg, fbk).
1. b1 determines the time interval Ti and computes gpkfbi,rb1,i from gpk
fb (as given in CDLVerify*). b1
runs CDLSign*(msg, fbk , i, rb1,i, fb1 , creb1,i, gpk
fb
i,rb1,i
, gppfb) to output a signature σfb on fbr . b1 then
sends (fbr , σfb) to the TS.
2. The TS identifies the current time interval Tj . They check that j = i, and r < rmax. The TS verifies σfb
with CDLVerify*(fbr , σfb , gpk
fb , gppfb, E), rejecting (fbr , σfb) if this outputs false. If the list fblmsg al-
ready exists, then for all (fbr i, (σfb)i) in the list, it checks CDLLink*((fbr , σfb), (fbr i, (σfb)i), gpk
fb , gppfb).
If true is ever output, then (fbr , σfb) is rejected.
3. If the signature σ is valid, the TS opens msg using BOpen*(M,σ, smk, gpkm, gppm) to discover the
message’s author b2, to whom it can attribute the feedback. It stores the feedback fbk along with the
reputation rb1,i of b1. The TS regularly uses Aggr to update its reputation for b2 in its database.
4. If fblmsg does not exist then this list is created. (fbr , σfb) is added to fblmsg.
4.6 User Revocation
Users chosen by Detect are no longer provided with updated secret keys gskmb,j and credentials creb,j during
reputation retrieval, meaning they can no longer send public messages, or give feedback.
5 Evaluation
Misbehaving users are not punished by a reputation decrease until the next reputation retrieval, which allows
for less frequent communication with the TS. The TimeDiscount function forces users to update regularly,
and can be adjusted to take this trade off into account.
Messages could be sent during one time interval and received during the next. So that such messages are
accepted, if they are close to the end of the time interval they could be verified with the previous public key.
Constant access to the TS is not required; this is only required for reputation retrieval, and giving
feedback.
5.1 Verifiability
The security guarantees of BBS [5] and CDL [7] apply to BBS* and CDL*, as argued in [13] and section 3.5,
so that users must be enrolled to send public messages or feedback, for 1(a).
We now argue that all accepted messages and feedback are bound to the correct reputation, for 1(b) and
1(c).
For sending messages, during Ti, if a RCT value from a previous time interval Tj is used, with reputation
rj , then so the signature is valid they must find r such that H1(Ki
r) = H1(Kj
rj ). This is hard in the groups
used.
A user may try to increase their reputation by modifying a RCT value. The only way the user can
manipulate RCT , while ensuring successful verification, is to raise the RCT to some power a. Then they
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i ). Due to the groups used and the properties of hash functions,
this is hard.
When sending feedback, to modify their reputaion using RCT ′ values for previous or current time inter-
vals, the user must find (r,A
ξi,r
b ) given A
ξj,rj
b . As all ξi,r are independent and randomly chosen, this is not
possible.
5.2 Correctness
The opening function of BBS [5] ensures feedback can be traced back to its correct subject, for 2(a).
Feedback given more than once per public message can be detected, with CDLLink*, for 2(b).
The scheme can revoke users by no longer allowing them to update their secret keys, so requirement 2(c)
is satisfied. Therefore, revocation lists are not necessary.
Computational Costs for Users excluding Pre–computation
Sending Public Messages 9G1 + 4G3 nGi: n group operations in Gi
Verifying Public Messages 9G1 + 2G2 + 3G3 + 2PO1 nPOi: n pairing operations using the map tˆi
Updating Reputations 9G1 + 4G3 + (d+ 1)(1G1 + 2PO1 + 3G4 + 4PO2) d+ 1: number of time intervals secret keys
Signing Feedback 7 · G4 are updated for during a reputation retrieval.
Table 1: Computational costs of operations performed by users as part of our scheme.
5.3 Privacy
In [13] it is claimed that the security guarantees of BBS [5] imply requirement 3(a), of the privacy of public
messages, is satisfied. We claim in section 3.5 that the security guarantees of [7] imply requirement 3(b), of
the privacy of feedback, is satisfied.
5.4 Efficiency
5.4.1 Computational cost
In Table I we give the number of operations necessary for processes performed by users regularly. The
number of pairings can be reduced by precomputation and collapsing pairings [5].
Of these operations, pairings have the far greatest computational cost [11]. Excluding precomputation,
pairing operations are required for verifying messages and updating reputation, but not for signing feedback
or sending public messages. Using the Android PBC library [10], for the same security as 128 byte RSA
signatures, pairings are undertaken in 27 ms on a Samsung I9100. This would mean pairing operations would
take 54ms when verifying a BBS signature.
5.4.2 Communication Overhead
The communication overheads in our scheme when broadcasting public messages and updating reputation
include a BBS signature, a reputation value, and the time interval. For the same security as a 128 byte RSA
signature, the BBS signature has a length of 192 bytes [5]. The reputation value and time interval have a
length of at most 22 bytes and 4 bytes respectively, giving a total of at most 218 bytes.
For feedback the communication overheads include a CDL signature, a reputation value, and the time
interval. Using the same groups as for BBS, the CDL signature has a length of 150 bytes, giving a total of
176 bytes.
The average download speed of a smartphone on 4G is 14.7 mBit/s [4]. With this download speed, it
will take 0.12ms to download our largest overhead of 218 bytes.
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6 Conclusion
To address the lack of trust in PSNs of Strangers, we propose a reputation–based messaging schemeUsers
send public messages alongside their reputation, and then give feedback. Users who receive bad feedback
consistently are revoked. Public messages are anonymous and unlinkable to other users. If feedback is given
once per public message, it is untraceable and unlinkable to all.
To achieve this, we use the group signature scheme BBS* [13] and we modify the DAA scheme [7] in
CDL*, to allow users to update their secret key so that it is bound to a reputation score, without a secure
channel.
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